Conflicts: Jurisdiction to Divorce. Criticism of Jurisdiction Fact Theory. by Moynahan, B. T., Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 7
1938
Conflicts: Jurisdiction to Divorce. Criticism of
Jurisdiction Fact Theory.
B. T. Moynahan Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moynahan, B. T. Jr. (1938) "Conflicts: Jurisdiction to Divorce. Criticism of Jurisdiction Fact Theory.," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 27 :
Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss1/7
STUDENT NOTES 109
CONFLICTS: JURISDICTION TO DIVORCE. CRITICISM OF JURIS-
TIONAL FACT THEORY.
There are three leading Supreme Court cases raising the problem
of jurisdiction to divorce where one of the parties at the time of bring-
ing the action was domiciled outside the state of the forum.
In the first, Atherton v. Atherton,' the parties were married in
New York and went to Kentucky, where they resided for several years.
The wife returned to New York due to the husband's cruelty and the
husband later obtained a divorce in Kentucky on the ground of aban-
donment. The wife was not personally served, but a warning order
was sent to the postoffice nearest her last address, pursuant to statute.
The Kentucky action was not contested but later the wife sued for
divorce In New York.
The Supreme Court held that the Kentucky decree was entitled to
full faith and credit under the Constitution and was a bar to the New
York action, saying that the purpose of divorce was "to change the
existing status or domestic relation of the husband and wife and to
free them both from the bond".2 It was further stated that the rule
as to the notice necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce is
different from that which is required in suits in personam and that
since a reasonable effort was made to notify the wife she was precluded
from asserting that she left on account of the husband's cruelty.'
Mr. Justice Peckham dissented (the chief justice concurring in the
dissent) on the ground that if the husband was at fault the wife
acquired a separate domicil and that the New York court had the right
to go into the question of fault.y
In Haddock v. Haddock,6 decided a few years later, the parties were
married and lived in New York. The husband went to Connecticut,
established a domicil, and sued for divorce on the ground of abandon-
ment, process being constructively served. Later the wife sued for
divorce in New York. The court held that the Connecticut decree was
not entitled to full faith and credit and therefore was not a bar to the
New York action. The Atherton case was cited with approval but dis-
tinguished on the ground that the matrimonial domicil remained in
New York in the Haddock case, since the husband left without cause.
The argument was that the Connecticut decree was not binding outside
the state if the action was in rem because one-half of the res must be
with the wife in New York, and was not entitled to recognition if in per-
sonam because there was no personal service and the wife was not
constructively domiciled with the husband. The decision was by a
court divided five to four, Mr. Justice Holmes holding in a strong dis-
181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901).
2 U. S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 1.
3 181 U. S. 155, 162 (1901).
181 U. S. 155, 173 (1901).
181 U. S. 155, 174.
201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
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senting opinion that the case was in square conflict with Atherton v.
Atherton.
In the third case, Thompson v. Thompson,7 the Virginia court
granted a decree of separation to the husband, the parties having last
lived there as husband and wife. The wife had left the husband and
settled elsewhere and the only service was by publication. Later the
wife sued for divorce in the District of Columbia, but the court held
that the Virginia decree was entitled to full faith and credit citing
with approval both Atherton v. Atherton and Haddock v. Haddock.
These three cases were reconciled on the ground that in the Haddock
case the forum was not that of the last matrimonial domicil,' whereas
in the other two cases the action was brought at the last matrimonial
domicil.
Logically it would seem that the Supreme Court has reached the
correct result since the state of the last matrimonial domicil should
be better able to pass on the question of fault, due to the fact that the
pertinent information would be more readly available.
A different view is embodied in the Restatement' to the effect that
a divorce granted at the domicil of one of the spouses is entitled to
full faith and credit where:
(1) The spouse not domiciled in the state consented that the
other spouse acquire a separate home.
(2) By misconduct the other spouse has ceased to have the
right to object to the acquisition of a separate home.
It is suggested that this would be a panacea for our present ills
In that it would secure uniformity and eliminate the situation that
arises where one state holds the parties married and another holds
them divorced."
There is some authority to support this position, several state
courts having held that a divorce granted at the domicil of one of the
parties without personal jurisdiction of the other will be given full
faith and credit only if the divorce is granted at the domicil of the
party without fault."
The writer is of the opinion, however, that the "jurisdictional fact"
theory as laid down by the Restatement would cause more harm than
good. In the first place it is difficult to follow the language used.
What is meant by "consent to acquire a separate home"? What con-
stitutes consent? Need it be express or may it be implied? Need it
'226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347 (1913).
8 Callaghan v. Callaghan, 65 Misc. Rep. 172, 121 N. Y. S. 39 (1909).
. . . matrimonial domicil would seem to be the place where the
parties last lived together as husband and wife with the intention of
making that place their home".
'Restatement Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 605 (1906).
"Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719 (1932); Perkins
v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841, L. R. A. 1917B, 1028 (1916);
Montmorency v. Montmorency, 139 S. W. 1168 (Tex. 1911).
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be affirmative or would passive acquiescence with knowledge of the
facts bind the other spouse?
Then too suppose the following factual situation in the Haddock
case:
The wife sues in state X for separate maintenance and later the
husband sues in state Y for a divorce a vinculo. The husband gets a
-decree in state Y never having been personally served in state X.
Can the wife now secure the relief sought in state X? It would appear
that she could not since by asking for separate maintenance she seem-
ingly consents that the husband acquire a separate home and yet this
result Is at variance with the Haddock case.
lMoreover in the above case, state X may give full faith and credit
to the decree of state Y on the basis of comity 2 regardless of the
consent or non-consent of the domiciliary wife to the establishment of
a separate home by the husband. Yet the Restatement holds that
unless the wife consents to the husband's acquisition of a new home, or
loses her right to object, the Y decree is void for any purpose because
of lack of jurisdiction and only state X can issue a valid decree of dis-
solution without personal jurisdiction of both parties.
In addition, the uniformity claimed becomes illusory when it is
considered that two jurisdictions have the right to pass on the question
of fault and thus a cloud is placed on any subsequent marriage which
can only be removed by the Supreme Court. It should be noted that in
many cases this is not feasible since the complaining party is in no
position to complain of an ajudication in his favor and the other party
may not decide to carry the case up to the highest court for several
years.
In conclusion it is submitted that the Restatement is of little if
any real help in that it introduces greater factors of uncertainty than
those already existing and that therefore a divorce is entitled to full
faith and credit:
(1) If granted at the domicil of both parties.
(2) If granted at the domicil of either spouse with personal
jurisdiction of the other through service or appearance.
(3) If granted at the last matrimonial domicil even though
there was no actual service within the state and no appearance, so
long as there was such constructive notice as is required by the
law of the state."3  B. T. MOYNAHAN, J.
JURISDICTIONS ADOPTING THE TORT STANDARD OF CARE IN
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the degree of negligence
necessary to constitute manslaughter in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the negligence rule used in civil cases.
This rule, although the minority one, is rather definite and readily
12Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 581 (1906).
Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 328, 28 L. Ed. 29S
(1884); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 171, 172 (1901).
